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Introduction
Recent advances in information technologies allow …rms to collect, analyze and share detailed information about customers and to use this information for targeted o¤ers. The use of customer databases for price discrimination attracted the attention of regulators and privacy advocates alike. Two types of cooperation based on customer data are particularly wide-spread: i) cooperative data collection, and ii) information sharing.
There are several industries, where rivals cooperate in obtaining customer data. For example, national medical associations often provide uniform software solutions to members in order to manage patient medical records, which essentially standardizes customer data doctors acquire.
Another example of cooperative data acquisition is the case of U.S. colleges, where education institutions cooperate in the College Board to jointly collect information on students for awarding institutional aid funds.
Beyond cooperation on data acquisition, the possibility to share customer data between competitors is also widely discussed in many industries. Airlines exchange detailed data on personal characteristics and travel details of passengers and target promotions to customers.
Other examples include the retail industry, where …rms join database cooperatives to share customer information for marketing purposes. Participants of information exchange include magazines and newspapers, which trade personal information about subscribers.
Joint customer data acquisition and information sharing initiated a heated debate between consumer privacy advocates, business groups, competition authorities and other regulators. At the same time, theoretical work on the topic is still evolving. We analyze the incentives of rival …rms to cooperate on the acquisition and sharing of customer data, when …rms use data to make targeted price o¤ers. We also evaluate welfare e¤ects of these practices in the context of a modi…ed Hotelling model with competitive …rst-and third-degree price discrimination.
We extend the standard model by introducing heterogeneity in consumer transportation costs.
In addition, we allow …rms to hold two di¤erent datasets on consumers re ‡ecting i) brand preferences and ii) transportation cost parameters. Moreover, …rms may only hold data on all consumers. We do not consider the case where …rms hold data on a subset of consumers.
Our approach applies well to markets, where a leading …rm with a new technology is enabled to collect detailed customer pro…les and to provide tailored services based upon these pro…les, while competitors do not have the same ability. It also applies to newly liberalized markets, 2 where the incumbent holds detailed purchase histories of all consumers. Depending on the data a …rm holds, it o¤ers uniform prices to all consumers, targets speci…c consumer groups (thirddegree price discrimination) or sets individual prices (…rst-degree price discrimination). Firms may obtain data in addition to existing datasets and exchange data with the rival.
We are interested in three main questions: First, what type of data is acquired by both …rms when …rms agree to cooperatively collect data? Second, under what conditions is a …rm holding a particular dataset willing to provide the competitor with access to it? Third, how does data acquisition cooperation and information sharing a¤ect competition and welfare? To focus on the competitive e¤ects of joint information acquisition and sharing, we assume that …rms use data solely for price discrimination purposes. The important questions of collusion incentives and consumer privacy are beyond the scope of the present article.
We make the following contributions: By introducing heterogeneity in consumer transportation cost parameters into the standard Hotelling model, we show how incentives to acquire and share customer data depend on the type of information. Further, we allow …rms to hold asymmetric data on consumers and derive incentives for partial information sharing.
Our results highlight the important role of the willingness of consumers to switch brands on the incentives of …rms to jointly acquire data or to engage in information sharing. If a small price decrease can motivate a relatively large share of consumers to switch brands, cooperation between …rms (holding similar types of customer data) for acquiring additional data does not take place. However, there is potential for information sharing, which is neutral for consumers and enhances social welfare. On the other hand, if consumers are generally loyal to their …rms and price changes induce little switching, cooperation on data acquisition and sharing can be pro…table. If such cooperation takes place, it is harmful to consumer surplus.
The main intuition of our results is as follows: If consumers are relatively mobile, a cooperation aimed at increasing the ability of …rms to target individuals or speci…c groups is more likely to induce competition. This in turn provides little scope for using data for extracting rents, which makes cooperation unattractive for …rms. Information sharing may still be pro…table for …rms, if it increases allocative e¢ ciency, arising from the even allocation of consumers between …rms. Equilibrium pricing strategies change with the mobility of consumers. When consumers are relatively immobile, price changes induce little switching. Firms can use customer data to extract rents from consumers, whereas the competition-intensifying e¤ect of additional data is weak. Under these circumstances, consumers are likely to be harmed when …rms cooperate by joint customer data acquisition or information sharing.
We conclude that competition authorities ought to scrutinize cooperation agreements between rival …rms with respect to customer data acquisition and sharing on a case-by-case basis.
Apart from the possibility that intensi…ed information ‡ows between rivals may facilitate collusion, a critical aspect concerning the competitive e¤ects of a cooperation based upon customer data is whether consumers are mobile enough to render positive e¤ects.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. The model is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we investigate the incentives of …rms to cooperate in acquiring information on consumers. Section 5 turns to the analysis of information sharing, Section 6 concludes. Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
Related Literature
Despite the increasing importance of the acquisition and sharing of customer information among rivals, few theoretical articles directly addressed this issue. 1 Most relevant to our work are Liu and Serfes (2006) and Chen et al. (2001) , who focus on the sharing of data on customer brand preferences between rivals. Liu and Serfes employ a two-period duopoly model with horizontally and vertically di¤erentiated …rms. In the …rst period, …rms set uniform prices and collect information about customers. In the second period, …rms use the information to make personalized o¤ers. The authors show that information sharing takes place if …rms are su¢ ciently asymmetric in customer bases. With su¢ cient asymmetry, the smaller …rm has an incentive to share its customer information with the larger one. We take a di¤erent approach to model information exchange: By allowing …rms to distinguish between consumer brand preferences and transportation cost parameters, we are able to address the question of partial information sharing, i.e., the exchange of only one type of information. In contrast to the results of Liu and Serfes is Chen et al. (2001) , who show that …rms engage in the sharing of customer data only when market shares are not too asymmetric and the level of customer targetability is low. Liu and Serfes (2006) as well as Chen et al. (2001) argue that it is the market shares of …rms that drives information sharing. In our setup it is the willingness of consumers to switch brands together with the portfolio of data that …rms hold, which determines whether or not information sharing takes place. In contrast to the cited literature we …nd that information sharing may occur even with …rms having perfectly symmetric market shares, depending on the consumer data …rms hold. Similar to our analysis, Esteves (2009) considers price discrimination in a two-dimensional setting where …rms have access to partial information on brand and product preferences of consumers. The author presents a two-dimensional Hotelling model with consumers located on a unit square, where the axes represent the two dimensions of consumer preferences. With partial information, …rms can observe a consumer's location in only one of two dimensions and discriminate accordingly. Her main result is that price discrimination increases industry pro…ts, if …rms have information about the locations of consumers in the less di¤erentiated dimension and ignore information about the more di¤erentiated one.
This article is also related to the literature on competitive price discrimination. Earlier articles in this strand of literature focus on the question whether competition eliminates price discrimination. Borenstein (1985) presents a spatial model of monopolistic competition and shows that price discrimination prevails in a duopoly environment. He treats consumers as being heterogeneous along three dimensions: their reservation prices and brand preferences as well as the strength of the latter. The author relies on numerical simulation to determine which sorting strategy is more pro…table: price discrimination based upon reservation prices or strength of brand preferences. Several newer articles on competitive price discrimination focus on consumer targetability, see e.g. Serfes (2005, 2007) , Chen and Zhang (2009).
Thisse and Vives (1988) apply a standard Hotelling model, where …rms may or may not observe the location of each consumer in the market. The authors show that price discrimination tends to intensify competition for each consumer and that discriminatory prices are usually lower than uniform prices. A similar insight is derived from a model of competitive couponing by Bester and Petrakis (1996) who analyze the sellers'incentives to o¤er rebates to their customers in two distinct regions. They …nd that o¤ering rebates to consumers in form of coupons tends to intensify competition, which leads to lower prices and pro…ts. In their survey on price discrimination Armstrong (2006) and Stole (2007) summarize the competitive e¤ects of price discrimination and use the notion of best-response symmetry and asymmetry originally introduced by Corts (1998) . We will rely on this concept to explain our results and discuss it in greater detail later on. 5 
The Model
We present a duopoly pricing game between two di¤erentiated …rms, A and B, each selling a variety of the same product. Firms are situated at the two ends of a Hotelling line of unit length with …rm A located at point 0 and …rm B at point 1. Every consumer is characterized by an address x 2 [0; 1] corresponding to his brand preference for the ideal product. If the consumer buys from a …rm, which does not provide the ideal product, he incurs linear transportation costs proportional to the distance to the …rm. We depart from the standard Hotelling setup by introducing heterogeneity in consumer transportation costs per unit distance, which we denote by t 2 [t; t]. Consumers are distributed uniformly and independently on a rectangle, where the horizontal (vertical) axis represents consumer brand preference (transportation cost parameter).
The mass of consumers is normalized to one and every consumer is uniquely described by a pair (t; x). With t and x being uniformly and independently distributed, we have the following density functions: f t = 1=(t t), f x = 1, f t;x = 1=(t t). We distinguish between two versions of the model based on the distribution of transportation cost parameters. In the …rst version we call consumers relatively mobile and assume that t = 0. In the second version we assume that t > 0 and t=t 2 and label consumers as relatively immobile. When consumers are relatively mobile, switching brands is costless for some consumers (those with t = 0). In the model with relatively immobile consumers, switching involves costs for every consumer, and the di¤erence between the highest and lowest transportation cost parameter is not too large. 2 The utility of a consumer from buying at …rm i 2 fA; Bg is given by
where is a basic utility from consuming the product, which is the same across all consumers, x i is …rm i's address with x A = 0 and x B = 1 and p i (t; x) is the price …rm i o¤ers to consumer (t; x). A consumer buys from the …rm delivering higher utility. Firm A provides a strictly higher utility if the following condition holds:
Assumption 1 states our tie-breaking rule.
Assumption 1: In case both …rms o¤ er equal utilities, i.e.,
the consumer chooses the …rm closer in the brand preference space (if x = 1=2, then w.l.o.g. the consumer visits …rm A).
In case of a price tie, consumers behave in the socially optimal manner and choose the closest Marginal costs are assumed to be zero. Firms set prices p i (t; x) to maximize their pro…ts,
with X i and T i denoting the domains of locations and transportation cost parameters for consumers who buy from …rm i. Next, we explain the way …rms may acquire, hold and share customer data and describe the game played.
Customer Data and Timing
Let X and T be two sets containing information about the brand preferences and transportation cost parameters of all consumers, respectively. We refer to X and T as datasets. We de…ne the union of datasets …rm i holds as …rm i's information set and denote it by I i . Each …rm may either hold information only about transportation cost parameters (I i = T ), only about brand preferences (I i = X), complete information about consumer preferences
or no information (I i = ;). To simplify the notation, we write I i = XT to denote the case where …rm i has complete information on consumers. We use the term information scenario to describe the datasets held by both …rms in a pricing game, fI A ; I B g. Firms may engage in two types of cooperation involving customer data: i) joint information acquisition, and ii) information sharing. We analyze these cooperation types separately.
In the case of joint information acquisition (JIA), the following game is played:
Stage 1 (JIA): Firms decide cooperatively whether or not to acquire dataset X or T or both from an external source, in addition to the data they already hold. Simultaneously, they decide on a distribution rule for pro…ts realized in the next stage. Apart from this transfer, the acquisition of data is assumed to be costless. After the data is acquired, it becomes available to both …rms. When …rms cooperate in information sharing (IS), the game unfolds as follows:
The …rm holding more datasets decides whether and which dataset to sell to the rival. Simultaneously, the …rms decide on a distribution rule for pro…ts realized in the next stage, which determines the price of the dataset sold. After the sale of a dataset, it is available to both …rms. With relatively mobile consumers, for any strictly positive price of the competitor, a …rm …nds it pro…table to undercut the rival: a small advantage in price allows to attract new consumers.
Zero prices can not constitute an equilibrium either: by increasing its price slightly, a …rm can attract the closest consumers with the highest transportation cost parameters and make positive pro…ts. With relatively immobile consumers, undercutting the competitor does not constitute a pro…table strategy in the equilibrium as consumers do not easily switch brands.
We next consider equilibria in other information scenarios. Proposition 1 states our results.
Proposition 1. Equilibrium prices and pro…ts in each information scenario are as stated in Tables 1 and 2 , respectively.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that in equilibrium …rms use all available customer data for price discrimination and do not ignore any data. The equilibrium prices in Table 1 are functions of the available data that …rms hold. In symmetric information scenarios, a …rm's best-response function speci…es the pro…t-maximizing price to any given price of the competitor. In this case, the only e¤ect of not using all available customer data is to decrease the degrees of freedom in pricing. The 
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To understand the di¤erences in equilibrium pro…ts in Table 2 , it is useful to recall the concepts of best-response symmetry and best-response asymmetry discussed by Corts (1998) .
He refers to models, where both …rms set higher prices for the same group of consumers as exhibiting best-response symmetry. In contrast, best-response asymmetry exists, where one …rm sets lower (higher) prices for those consumers who have a higher (lower) willingness to pay for the other …rm. Prices and pro…ts tend to be higher with best-response symmetry and lower with best-response asymmetry. To illustrate this, we …rst consider symmetric information scenarios. In these cases, with both relatively mobile and relatively immobile consumers, pro…ts are the highest when both …rms have data only on consumer transportation cost parameters.
In contrast, if both …rms hold dataset X (either alone or together with dataset T ), they realize lower pro…ts.
We obtain best-response symmetry when …rms only know transportation cost parameters.
All other symmetric information scenarios give rise to best-response asymmetry. When …rms only hold dataset T , both set higher prices for those consumers, who are less willing to switch brands (i.e., those with higher values of t) and lower prices to those, who are ready to switch brands. In our case, best-response functions take the form
for i; j 2 fA; Bg and i 6 = j. Provided that p j < 3t, p
…rms have information only on brand preferences and consumers are relatively immobile, the best-response functions for x < 1=2 are
, then the best-response functions take the form:
Clearly, in the case where …rms have data only on brand preferences, every …rm sets a higher price for consumers, who prefer its brand and lower ones for those who like the competitor more. As both groups of consumers (x < 1=2 and x > 1=2) have di¤erent brand preferences, the best-response functions imply best-response asymmetry. Formally, p
If both types of information are available to the …rms, best-response asymmetry is preserved. The best-response functions in this case are
where is an in…nitesimal, positive value. It is easily veri…ed that p
, hence, the reaction functions imply best-response asymmetry.
In the asymmetric information scenarios, …rms' pro…ts are the highest in the information scenario fT; ;g, in which case both …rms set high prices to consumers. In contrast, pro…ts are the lowest in the information scenario fXT; Xg, which exhibits best-response asymmetry.
The concepts of best-response symmetry and asymmetry explain well why prices and pro…ts are higher in some information scenarios than in others.
In the following we demonstrate that the concepts, nevertheless, do not completely explain the incentives to jointly acquire and share customer data. In particular, they cannot be applied to situations when the market exhibits the same best-response property before and after cooperation.
By jointly acquiring customer data that neither …rm holds beforehand or by making a proprietary database available to the rival, …rms can in ‡uence the competitive environment. These decisions are the subject of the next sections.
Joint Acquisition of Customer Data
We now analyze the incentives of …rms to cooperatively acquire customer data for price discrimination. We focus on symmetric information scenarios with …rms holding identical datasets and analyze the incentives to jointly acquire additional information on consumer preferences, which (after acquisition) becomes available to both …rms.
First, our results show that price discrimination may provide su¢ cient incentives for joint information acquisition. Only information on consumer transportation cost parameters can be jointly acquired, but not information on brand preferences. Second, incentives to jointly acquire data on transportation cost parameters depend on the consumer willingness to switch brands.
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Although more information potentially allows …rms to extract more rents from consumers, intensi…ed price competition may reduce prices and pro…ts. The competition e¤ect dominates, if consumer mobility is relatively high. If consumers are relatively loyal to their brands, acquiring data on transportation cost parameters induces little additional competition. The following proposition summarizes our insights on joint data acquisition incentives and Table 3 illustrates our results for the case of relatively mobile consumers with t = 1 and the case of relatively immobile consumers with t = 1 and t = 2.
Proposition 2. Firms' incentives to jointly acquire information on consumer preferences depend on the distribution of transportation cost parameters.
i) If consumers are relatively mobile and …rms have partial information on consumers (either fI A ; I B g = fX; Xg or fI A ; I B g = fT; T g), …rms have no incentives to jointly acquire further information for price discrimination purposes. Pro…ts across symmetric information scenarios are ranked as
ii) If consumers are relatively immobile, …rms do not jointly acquire dataset X, but acquire dataset T . Pro…ts across information scenarios are ranked as
Firms do not jointly acquire information on brand preferences, but only acquire information on consumer transportation cost parameters. Since additional information on consumer brand preferences always induces best-response asymmetry, …rms do not jointly acquire dataset X. If …rms initially have no information on consumers and acquire dataset T; they switch to bestresponse symmetry, which increases industry pro…ts.
When …rms initially hold dataset X and cooperate on gathering dataset T , the concepts of best-response symmetry and asymmetry cannot be applied to explain incentives to acquire customer data. As mentioned above, both information scenarios fX; Xg and fXT; XT g exhibit best-response asymmetry. Whether information acquisition takes place, depends on consumer mobility and is not driven by a change in the best-response property of the market. If consumers do not di¤er much in terms of the strength of their brand preferences (i.e., t=t 2), acquiring dataset T is pro…table. If, however, consumer mobility is relatively high, then complementing dataset X with T reduces industry pro…ts.
A closer look at the two main e¤ects at work reveals why …rms do not acquire dataset T in addition to brand preference data with relatively mobile consumers and why they do acquire it 14 No if consumer mobility is low. First, the rent-extraction e¤ ect: more information on consumers enables …rms to better target and segment consumers. Second, the competition e¤ ect takes account for the change in the strength of price competition between …rms. Whether …rms have incentives to acquire additional information on consumers depends on the sum of these two e¤ects.
If consumers are relatively immobile, they visit the closest …rm in both information scenarios fX; Xg and fXT; XT g, as shown in Figure 1 . Additional information on transportation cost parameters allows …rms to better target consumers. Although with the …rms having both datasets X and T each consumer receives individual o¤ers from both …rms, as consumers are relatively immobile, the better targeting induces little competition and the rent-extraction e¤ect dominates.
However, if consumers are mobile, …rms will not complement their existing data on brand preferences with dataset T . Note that pricing strategies and, hence, equilibrium prices in the scenario where both …rms have full information, do not depend on the distribution of transportation cost parameters. The reason for the altered incentives to acquire dataset T is that the pricing decisions of …rms in the information scenario fX; Xg change depending on the mobility of consumers. Let us take a closer look at the strategies of the …rms in this information scenario.
Due to the symmetry of …rms, it is su¢ cient to focus on the region with x 1=2 and analyze competition on …rm A's turf.
In information scenario fX; Xg, if consumer mobility is low, for any given price by …rm B to a group of consumers with brand preferences x 1=2, …rm A can keep all consumers in this group without signi…cantly decreasing its price o¤ered to them. Firm A's optimal strategy is to set a price for a group x, which allows to attract all members, even those who are most willing to switch, i.e., consumers with the lowest transportation cost parameters. The low willingness of consumers to switch brands and …rm A's strategy to hold them all in turn induces …rm B to price very aggressively on A's turf and to decrease its price to zero, putting a downward pressure on …rm A's prices. In the end, …rm A is able to keep all consumers on its own turf, but only by charging every group x a relatively low price. The same forces are at work on …rm B's turf.
With industry pro…ts being relatively low, moving into the scenario with full customer data is attractive for the competitors, where they can extract more consumer surplus. If consumer mobility is high, it is expensive for …rm A to hold all consumers with a given x. To achieve this, …rm A must reduce its prices to prevent consumers with the lowest transportation costs from switching to …rm B. It is more pro…table for …rm A to give up the most mobile consumers and set a price for every group x; which targets the consumers with higher values of t. Firm B is, hence, able to capture the most mobile consumers on A's turf, even with a relatively high price.
In the emerging equilibrium …rm A sets prices to every group x on its turf to target consumers with higher transportation cost parameters, while …rm B targets those with lower values of t.
With industry pro…ts being relatively high in the information scenario fX; Xg, …rms do not want to acquire data on consumer transportation costs.
Our results show that best-response symmetry and asymmetry are not anchored in a particular type of information. The same type of information can induce both best-response symmetry and asymmetry depending on the additional data …rms own. In particular, information on transportation cost parameters may induce di¤erent strategies, either best-response symmetry (if only dataset T is available) or best-response asymmetry (if dataset T is combined with dataset X).
This extends the analysis in Armstrong (2006) , who emphasizes that …rms have an incentive to acquire information about their consumers, if …rms can discriminate between consumers according to their transportation cost parameters. We show that this might not always be the case: It holds that industry pro…ts are higher if …rms can only discriminate based on T compared to the case when …rms lack consumer data. However, depending on the distribution of transportation cost parameters, industry pro…ts may either decrease or increase, when …rms have access to both sets of information compared to the case, when they can only discriminate based on X.
Next, we compare consumer surplus and social welfare across information scenarios and draw ii) If consumers are relatively immobile, then consumer surplus is ranked as CS T jT < CS ;j; < CS XT jXT < CS XjX and social welfare is same in all the symmetric information scenarios. Joint acquisition of dataset T reduces consumer surplus and is neutral to social welfare.
Two e¤ects determine the ranking of consumer surplus along information scenarios: First, a competition e¤ect capturing the level of prices, and second, an allocative e¤ect related to the distribution of consumers between …rms. Allocative e¢ ciency requires that consumers choose the nearest …rm. The only case, where allocative e¢ ciency is distorted is the scenario where both …rms hold dataset X and consumers are relatively mobile: consumers with the lowest transportation cost parameters (t < t=3) then visit the …rm further away, giving rise to allocative ine¢ ciencies. When allocative e¢ ciency is preserved, the ranking of consumer surplus is the opposite of the ranking of industry pro…ts.
We conclude that price discrimination may provide su¢ cient incentives for …rms to cooperatively acquire information on consumer transportation costs. With mobile consumers, …rms do not acquire additional data if they already hold some, although doing so would be socially bene…cial. With immobile consumers, …rms cooperate on acquiring data on transportation cost
parameters, regardless what data they already have. This is neutral to social welfare and decreases consumer surplus.
Sharing of Customer Data
We now analyze the incentive of a …rm with more information to share it with the competitor.
Our main question is under which conditions a …rm possessing a particular dataset is willing to provide the competitor with access to it. The dataset(s) with information on brand preferences and/or on transportation cost parameters may be given to the rival. We call information exchange partial, if a …rm has access to both datasets, but shares only one of them with its competitor. The following proposition summarizes our results on information sharing and Table 4 shows how information sharing alters pro…ts using the examples with t = 1 for relatively mobile consumers and t = 1 and t = 2 for relatively immobile consumers.
Proposition 4.
Incentives to share information depend on the distribution of consumer transportation cost parameters and the portfolio of data …rms hold.
i) With relatively mobile consumers, a …rm with full information on consumers shares its data on transportation cost parameters with the competitor, if the latter holds data on customer brand preferences.
ii) If consumers are relatively immobile, then data on consumer transportation cost parameters is shared in two cases: First, if one …rm has full information on consumers, whereas the other holds data on customer brand preferences, and second, if one …rm has full information on consumers, whereas the other has no data.
Proof. See Appendix. consumer brand preferences is never shared in our model. The reason for this is that dataset X induces best-response asymmetry (and, hence, stronger competition) if both …rms have it. This o¤sets any bene…ts arising from the possibility to better target consumers. Although dataset X is never shared, it plays a decisive role for the incentives of …rms whether to share the dataset T . We call this interplay between the datasets X and T the portfolio e¤ ect. With this label we refer to the observation that the incentives to share a particular dataset depend on what other data both …rms already hold. The same dataset may or may not be shared with the competitor depending on what additional data …rms already hold. In particular, the necessary condition for sharing dataset T is that the …rm with more information also holds dataset X. If one …rm owns data only on transportation cost parameters (while the other has no data at all), information sharing does not take place. 3 Our results highlight the importance of consumer transportation cost parameters on the incentives of …rms to share customer data. With mobile consumers, a …rm with full information does not share its dataset T with the competitor who holds no data, while in the same scenario with relatively immobile consumers this data is shared even without monetary transfers. Figure 2 presents the demand regions with relatively mobile and immobile consumers for the information scenarios fXT; ;g and fXT; T g. The di¤erences in incentives to share dataset T in the scenario fXT; ;g depend on consumer mobility and originate from the di¤erences in pricing strategies of the …rm with less information (…rm B) before potential data sharing. In the scenario after information sharing (i.e., in fXT; T g) regardless of the distribution of transportation cost parameters, …rm B sets p B = t=2 and …rm A matches this price to leave consumers indi¤erent whenever it can with a non-negative price. Firm A pursues the same strategy in the information scenario before potential information sharing (i.e., in fXT; ;g): it matches the price of the competitor and leaves consumers indi¤erent whenever it can set a non-negative price. The strategy of …rm B; however, depends on the level of consumer mobility in information scenario fXT; ;g.
If consumers are mobile, …rm B tailors its price to target only the most loyal consumers (i.e., those who are close to it and have high transportation costs). This relatively high price serves as basis for …rm A as well, resulting in high overall industry pro…ts. In contrast, with relatively immobile consumers (given …rm A's strategy), it is optimal for …rm B to set a uniform price, which allows to attract some of the consumers even with the lowest transportation costs, close to …rm B. The latter must decrease its price to avoid being undercut by …rm A, resulting in a relatively low uniform price set by …rm B. As …rm A bases its prices on …rm B's uniform price, all prices in the market are relatively low.
What changes, if …rm B obtains database T ? By being able to identify groups of consumers with the same transportation cost parameters, …rm B sets lower (higher) prices to those with lower (higher) values of t. With relatively mobile consumers, …rm B's uniform price is targeted at consumers with higher values of t. In this case the improved ability to price discriminate allows …rm B to increase its price only for a few consumers (with nearly maximal values of transportation cost parameters), while it reduces the price for all consumers with lower t values.
As …rm A acts similarly, the additional information generally leads to a price decrease in the market. With relatively immobile consumers, the price of …rm B is aimed to appeal even to consumers with low values of t. And with additional data on transportation cost parameters …rm B can increase the price for most consumers, which drives up …rm A's prices as well. Hence, with immobile consumers both …rms pro…t from sharing dataset T .
Finally, we turn to the welfare implications of customer information sharing. Proposition 5 summarizes our insights. ii) With relatively immobile consumers, information sharing always decreases consumer surplus and social welfare either decreases or does not change.
Proposition 5 highlights the importance of consumer mobility for the welfare e¤ects of information sharing. When consumers are relatively mobile, information sharing is Pareto-optimal:
it increases pro…ts and leaves consumer surplus unchanged. However, with relatively immobile 
Conclusions
It is increasingly observable that competitors in di¤erent information-intensive industries coordinate on information acquisition in terms of standardization or exchange pro…les of their customers with each other. These activities have raised the suspicion of consumer advocates as well as regulatory authorities. We present a modi…ed Hotelling model with …rst-and thirddegree price discrimination and horizontally di¤erentiated …rms, which possess di¤erent sets of data on consumer preferences (that is brand preferences and transportation cost parameters).
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Of particular interest to us are two kinds of agreements between rivals: joint acquisition and sharing of customer data.
We model cooperation with regard to customer data in a novel manner: We distinguish between two datasets …rms may acquire and share, which encompass brand preferences and
transportation cost parameters. We analyze how the incentives to engage in cooperation involving customer data depend on the type of information. Furthermore, we allow …rms to hold asymmetric customer data. A …rm with more datasets can decide to share its datasets with the competitor. With relatively mobile consumers, …rms do not cooperate on acquiring customer data, if they already hold any of the two datasets. When consumers are immobile, …rms cooperate to obtain the dataset on transportation cost parameters regardless of whether they possess data on brand preferences. In this case, information acquisition reduces consumer surplus and is neutral to social welfare. Incentives to share information depend on the portfolio of data the …rms hold and the distribution of consumers with respect to their transportation cost parameters. Information sharing may arise with both relatively mobile and immobile consumers.
Whereas information sharing is at best neutral for consumer surplus, it enhances social welfare with relatively mobile consumers.
Our results highlight that the evaluation of such agreements depends on the welfare standard adopted by a competition authority. Competition authorities pursuing a consumer surplus standard should be critical towards cooperation agreements between competitors involving customer data. Consumers are especially likely to be harmed, if their willingness to switch brands is low.
Taking into account other potentially problematic issues such as privacy and collusion (which are not addressed herein), we are sceptical that consumers bene…t overall from such agreements.
However, under a social welfare standard information sharing is bene…cial, if consumers are relatively mobile, in which case it improves allocative e¢ ciency.
Appendix
De…nitions and Notation. Before we proceed with the proofs, we introduce some de…nitions and notation. Let t c (p A ; p B ; x) denote the transportation cost parameters of those consumers with brand preference x, who are indi¤erent between …rms A and B for given prices p A and p B :
Pr ft t c g = 1 if t c ( ) < t. As equilibrium strategies may di¤er on the intervals x < 1=2 and x > 1=2, it is useful to distinguish between t c := t c ( ; x < 1=2) and t c := t c ( ; x > 1=2).
Similarly, let x c (p A ; p B ; t) denote the brand preference of consumers with transportation cost parameter t indi¤erent between …rms A and B for given prices p A and p B :
Pr fx x c ( )g = 1 if x c ( ) < 0. Let x(p A ; p B ; t) and x(p A ; p B ; t) denote the brand preferences of the indi¤erent consumers for given prices p A and p B with the lowest and highest transportation cost parameters, respectively. Formally, t c (p A ; p B ; x) = t and t c (p A ; p B ; x) = t.
We introduce A(t; t) := (t+t)=2 and H(t; t) := (t t)= ln(t=t) to denote the arithmetic and the harmonic mean of the transportation cost parameters t 2 t; t when t > 0, respectively. Note that for any t, t it holds that A(t; t) > H(t; t). We also introduce e H(t; t) := (t t)= ln (2t t)=t .
Moreover, if t > 0 we denote the ratio of the highest and the lowest transportation cost parameters as k := t=t.
We will omit the notation of information scenarios for best-response functions and equilibrium prices, which should be clear from the context.
Proof of Lemma 1. We …rst prove part i) of Lemma 1. We show that a small deviation downwards from the competitor's price is always pro…table. Without loss of generality we focus on the pricing of …rm A. If …rm A sets p A = p B > 0, it captures half of the consumers and realize pro…ts ;j;
. If …rm A deviates downwards by setting p A < p B , it captures all consumers on its own turf and some consumers with low transportation cost parameters on the competitor's turf. Solving t c ( ) = t for x we obtain x = (p B p A )=(2t) + 1=2. Comparing pro…ts with and without deviation from p B > 0, we obtain that deviation is not pro…table if p B < + t= 1 t ln( =t) for any 2 (0; p B ]. We now show that there is no such price p B , which ful…lls the latter condition. Note that the RHS of this condition is increasing in , hence, it is ful…lled for any 2 (0; It remains to consider whether p A = p B = 0 constitutes an equilibrium. This is not the case as these prices yield zero pro…ts to both …rms. With a minimal deviation upward, …rm A could attract the nearest consumers with the highest transportation cost parameters and make positive pro…t. This completes the proof of part i) in Lemma 1.
We now turn to the proof of part ii). Assume that t > 0 and t=t 2. Since …rms are symmetric, we focus without loss of generality on the pricing of …rm B. Consider …rst the case where …rm B sets a (weakly) higher price than …rm A:
Depending on the level of d, the demand regions may take two possible forms: One with x 1 (0 d t) and another with
In this case pro…ts are ;j;
Maximization yields the reaction function p i (p j ) = p j + H(t; t) =2 with i; j 2 fA; Bg and i 6 = j. The optimal prices are p = H(t; t). The corresponding pro…ts are ;j;
i (p ; p ) = H(t; t)=2. Note that these prices satisfy x 1. Assume next that t < d < t, in which case ;j;
B (H(t; t); H(t; t)
Taking the derivative with respect to d we get @ ;j;
B (H(t; t); H(t; t)+d)=@d = f (t) t d + 2d + H(t; t) ln d=t =2, which is negative if t=t 2. It follows that ;j; B (H(t; t); H(t; t)+d) < ;j; B (H(t; t); H(t; t)) for any 0 d t, hence, …rm B does not have an incentive to deviate upwards when …rm A sets p A = H(t; t).
We next analyze deviation downwards where …rm B sets a (weakly) lower price than …rm A:
Depending on the level of d, the demand regions may take two possible forms: One with 0 x 1=2 (0 d t) and another with x < 0 (t < d < H(t; t)). Let 0 d < t. Note that in this case the optimization problem of …rm B mirrors that of …rm A when 0 d t, and it holds that ;j;
B (H(t; t); H(t; t) d) ;j;
B (H(t; t); H(t; t)), with equality if d = 0. Assume next that t < d < H(t; t). Firm B realizes ;j;
. Taking the derivative with respect to d we get @ ;j;
B (H(t; t); H(t; t) d)=@d
This expression is negative with t=t 2. It follows that ;j;
B (H(t; t); H(t; t) d) < ;j;
B (H(t; t); H(t; t)). Hence, for any 0 d H(t; t) we have that ;j;
B (H(t; t); H(t; t)), with equality if d = 0, hence, …rm B does not have an incentive to deviate downwards when …rm A sets p A = H(t; t). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. We derive equilibrium prices and pro…ts of the …rms in di¤erent information scenarios. We …rst consider the symmetric information scenarios. Claim 1. Let t = 0. Consider the information scenario fX; Xg. In equilibrium …rm i sets p i (x) = 2t j1 2xj =3 on its own turf and p i (x) = t j1 2xj =3 on the competitor's turf. Firm i serves consumers with t t=3 on its own turf and consumers with t < t=3 on the competitor's turf and realizes pro…t x 1=2 we get t c = t=3. To compute …rm A's equilibrium pro…t we sum up the revenues across the demand regions: 
. This completes the proof of Claim 2.
Claim 3. Consider the information scenario fT; T g. In equilibrium …rm i sets p i (t) = t and serves all consumers on its own turf. Firms realize pro…ts
Proof of Claim 3. Both …rms treat consumer brand preference as a random variable and maximize their expected pro…ts:
which yields p A (t) = p B (t) = t and x c = 1=2. Firm A realizes the pro…t
This completes the proof of Claim 3.
Claim 4. Consider the information scenario fXT; XT g. In equilibrium …rm i sets p i (x; t) = t j1 2xj on its own turf and p i (x; t) = 0 on the competitor's turf, and serves all consumers on its own turf. Firms realizes pro…ts
Proof of Claim 4. As …rms are symmetric, we only consider pricing decisions in the region
Here …rm A has a cost advantage, hence, its best-response to any price of …rm B is to render consumers indi¤erent by setting p A (p B ) = p B + t(1 2x). Firm B's best-response is to undercut …rm A's price by setting p B (p A ) = p A t(1 2x) " whenever it is feasible (i.e., p A t(1 2x) > 0), with > 0. Otherwise, …rm B sets p B = 0. As undercutting is not possible in equilibrium, we get p B (x; t) = 0 and p A (x; t) = t(1 2x). Firm A's pro…t is
Due to the symmetry,
This completes the proof of Claim 4.
We now turn to the asymmetric information scenarios. Solving t c (x; p B ) = t we get x(p B ; t) = 1=2 + p B =(4t). If 1=2 < x < x(p B ; t), then …rm A gets all consumers, while it captures consumers with t < t c (x; p B ) if x x(p B ; t). Given …rm A's reaction functions, …rm B's pro…t is
of the latter pro…t yields p B = 0:47t < t, which implies that, indeed, 0 < x(p B ) < 1=2 and 
Maximizing with respect to p B yields p B = e H(t; t). Under the constraint 1 < k 2 it holds that e H(t; t) < t, hence, indeed, 1=2 < x(p B ; t) < x(p B ; t) < 1. Firm A's pro…t is computed as A = 21H(t; t)=32 + A(t; t)=8 and
Proof of Claim 7. Firm A takes p B as given and maximizes its expected pro…t E h T j;
and p A (p B ) = p B t if p B > 3t. From these reaction functions we get t c (x; p B ) = p B =(4x 1).
Assume that t > 0 and 1 < k 2. Solving t c (x; p B ) = t and t c (x; p B ) = t we get x(p B ; t) = 1=4 + p B =(4t) and x(p B ; t) = 1=4 + p B =(4t). Depending on the relation between x(p B ; t) and 1 two cases are possible in equilibrium:
We show that 3t p B < 3t does not emerge in equilibrium. Assume that 3t p B < 3t.
Firm B chooses its price to maximize the pro…t
There is no analytical solution to this problem, the value p B 0:85t is, however, a good numerical approximation which ful…lls the second order condition. Note that 0:85t < 3t given that 1 < k 2, hence, 3t p B < 3t cannot hold in equilibrium. Assume further that p B satis…es p B < 3t. Firm B maximizes the pro…t
dtdx, which yields p B = 3H(t; t)=2. Under the constraint 1 < k 2 it holds that 3H(t; t)=2 < 3t, hence, p B = 3H(t; t)=2 is, indeed, the equilibrium price.
Firm A'pro…ts are computed as
Equilibrium pro…ts are
A = 21H(t; t)=32 + A(t; t)=8 and T j; B = 9H(t; t)=16. Consider now t = 0. Maximization of
Firms realize pro…ts x(p B ; t) > 1 if t < p B < t. We show …rst that t < p B < t cannot characterize …rm B's equilibrium price. Assume that t < p B < t. Firm B sets p B to maximize the pro…t
[f (t)p B ] dtdx given …rm A's optimal strategy. The optimal price p B solves the
There is no analytical solution to this problem, the value p B 0:28t is, however, a good numerical approximation, which ful…lls the second order condition. Note that 0:28t < t given 1 < k 2, hence, t < p B < t is not possible in equilibrium. We show next that in equilibrium p B t. Assume this is the case. Firm B sets p B to maximize the pro…t
which yields p B = H(t; t)=2. Under the constraint 1 < k 2 it holds that H(t; t)=2 < t, hence, p B = H(t; t)=2 is indeed the equilibrium price. Firm A's pro…t is computed as Proof of Claim 9. Firm B treats t as a random variable and maximizes its expected pro…ts given …rm A's equilibrium strategy separately in the regions x 1=2 and x > 1=2. In the region
x 1=2 …rm A can undercut any price set by …rm B, hence, p B (x) = 0 for x 1=2. In the region x > 1=2 …rm A can undercut …rm B as long as it can set a non-negative price, which is the case if The second derivative of the RHS of the latter equality is negative on the interval 1 < k 2,
while the …rst derivative is positive if k = 2, hence, the RHS increases on the interval 1 < k 2.
As it approaches zero if k ! 1, we get that , from where we get SW XT jXT = SW T jT = v A(t; t)=4 and SW XjX = v 11A(t; t)=36.
The comparison is straightforward and yields the ranking SW XjX < SW XT jXT = SW T jT .
Consider now t > 0 and k 2. Note that in all the symmetric information scenarios …rms share the market equally, hence, social welfare is same and is given by SW XT jXT = v 3t=8. As was shown in the proof of Proposition 3, CS XT jXT = v 3t=8, hence, CS XT jX = CS XT jXT . Social welfare follows immediately from adding up …rms'pro…ts and consumer surplus such that SW XT jX v 0:16t < SW XT jXT = v 0:13t.
Consider now t > 0 and k 2. Consumer surplus in the information scenario fXT; ;g is CS XT j; = 
Consumers enjoy CS
the information scenario fXT; Xg. We showed in the proof of Proposition 3 that CS XT jXT = v 3A(t; t)=4, hence, CS XT jX > CS XT jXT . As in the information scenarios fXT; Xg and fXT; XT g every …rm serves consumers on the own turf, it follows that SW XT jX = SW XT jXT .
Q.E.D.
